The charge is of incompleteness Example: Where the hirer for a particular job has no personal stake, who should he choose for a job when the candidates have equal qualifications: Jack or Jill?
This objection holds good—there have to be some impartial decisions, and the belief that each person should seek his own interest does not tell how a person should act in this instance. Hence, the theory of ethical egoism is incomplete. When there is a conflict of interests between egoists, egoism provides no way to resolve the conflict. Final Comments on Ethical Egoism : the egoist is often seen to be egotistical and selfish, rather someone acting under enlightened self-interest.
Life is not seen as a contest between people so much as it is a challenge. If someone an egoist, then that person does not necessarily act against my own self-interest. Some observations are in order. Acting in one's self-interest very often benefits others. In pursuing your self-interest, you will get a job which will benefit others.
The egoist is affected by many more events than one would first think. If the egoist doesn't help others to be happy, they will not return the favor. Often, it is in our own interest to look to our long-term interests by the effects of our actions on other people as a group. Hence, there is no inconsistency for the egoist to help a group of which he is a part. If the egoist is to choose what is in his own interest, then he must have the personal freedom to choose.
Hence, the egoist must allow everyone to pursue his own personal interest universal ethical egoism. Hence, Rachels concludes that ethical egoism is an arbitrary doctrine and that others should be given the same moral consideration as ourselves because their merits and desires are comparable to our own. Overall, ethical egoism is a widely-rejected ethical theory with few contemporary advocates. Developing ethical egoism into a coherent, functional ethical theory would require massive revision to the original principle.
Harm can be accounted for in several ways. Related Articles:. Name First Last. An ethical egoist might reply by taking the cooperation argument further. Perhaps I cannot get the benefits of cooperation without converting to some non-egoist moral theory. That is, it is not enough that I act as if others have weight; I must really give them weight. I could still count as an egoist, in the sense that I have adopted the non-egoist theory on egoist grounds. One problem is that it seems unlikely that I can get the benefits of cooperation only by conversion.
Provided I act as if others have weight for long enough, others will take me as giving them weight, and so cooperate, whether I really give them weight or not. In many situations, others will neither have the ability to see my true motivation nor care about it.
Another problem is that conversion can be costly. I might be required by my non-egoist morality to make a sacrifice for which I cannot be compensated or pass up a gain so large that passing it up will not be compensated for. Since I have converted from egoism, I can no longer reject making the sacrifice or passing up the gain on the ground that it will not pay. It is safer, and seemingly feasible, to remain an egoist while cooperating in most cases.
If so, ethical egoism and standard moralities will diverge in some cases. For discussion of the cooperation argument, see Frank ; Gauthier ch.
There is another way to try to show that ethical egoism and standard moral theories do not differ much. One might hold one particular objective theory of self-interest, according to which my welfare lies in possessing the virtues required by standard moral theories.
This requires an argument to show that this particular objective theory gives the right account of self-interest. It also faces a worry for any objective theory: objective theories seem implausible as accounts of welfare. I may have a duty to help others, and the world might be better if I helped others, but it does not follow that I am better off by helping others.
For a more optimistic verdict on this strategy, noting its roots in Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics, and the British Idealists, see Brink and Of course the divergence between ethical egoism and standard moral theories need not bother an ethical egoist.
An ethical egoist sees egoism as superior to other moral theories. Whether it is superior depends on the strength of the arguments for it. Two arguments are popular. First, one might argue for a moral theory, as one argues for a scientific theory, by showing that it best fits the evidence. In the case of moral theories, the evidence is usually taken to be our most confident common-sense moral judgments.
Egoism fits many of these, such as the requirements of cooperation in ordinary cases. It fits some judgments better than utilitarianism does. For example, it allows one to keep some good, such as a job, for oneself, even if giving the good to someone else would help him slightly more, and it captures the intuition that I need not let others exploit me. The problem is that, as the discussion of the cooperation argument shows, it also fails to fit some of the confident moral judgments we make.
Second, one might argue for a moral theory by showing that it is dictated by non-moral considerations -- in particular, by facts about motivation. It is commonly held that moral judgments must be practical, or capable of motivating those who make them. If psychological egoism were true, this would restrict moral judgments to those made by egoism. Other moral judgments would be excluded since it would be impossible to motivate anyone to follow them.
One problem with this argument is that psychological egoism seems false. Replacing psychological with predominant egoism loses the key claim that it is impossible to motivate anyone to make an uncompensated sacrifice. The ethical egoist might reply that, if predominant egoism is true, ethical egoism may require less deviation from our ordinary actions than any standard moral theory.
But fit with motivation is hardly decisive; any normative theory, including ethical egoism, is intended to guide and criticize our choices, rather than simply endorse whatever we do. When I make an imprudent choice, this does not count against ethical egoism, and in favor of a theory recommending imprudence.
The argument has other problems. One could deny that morality must be practical in the required sense. Perhaps morality need not be practical at all: we do not always withdraw moral judgments when we learn that the agent could not be motivated to follow them. Or perhaps moral judgments must be capable of motivating not just anyone, but only idealized versions of ourselves, free from say irrationality.
In this case, it is insufficient to describe how we are motivated; what is relevant is a description of how we would be motivated were we rational. Finally, if I do not believe that some action is ultimately in my self-interest, it follows from psychological egoism that I cannot aim to do it.
But say I am wrong: the action is in my self-interest. Ethical egoism then says that it is right for me to do something I cannot aim to do. It violates practicality just as any other moral theory does. So far a number of arguments for ethical egoism have been considered. There are a number of standard arguments against it. Moore argued that ethical egoism is self-contradictory.
If I am an egoist, I hold that I ought to maximize my good. I deny that others ought to maximize my good they should maximize their own goods. I cannot possess the goodness. If my possession of x is good, then I must hold that others ought to maximize my possession of it.
I both deny and am committed to affirming that others ought to maximize my good. But it yields a different contradiction: if x is good, everyone ought to maximize it wherever it appears; egoists hold that I ought to maximize x only when it appears in me. In reply, C. Broad rightly noted that this does not show that egoism is self -contradictory, since it is not part of egoism to hold that what is good ought to be pursued by everyone Broad But that reply does not defend egoism from the charge of falsity.
If so, it does not follow simply from my possession of x being good that others ought to do anything Prichard Moore also suggests that the reason for me to pursue my good is the goodness of the thing I obtain. If what I obtain is good, then there is reason for everyone to pursue it, not just in me, but anywhere. Again, moving to good-for-me avoids this consequence.
But something close to this argument is plausible, especially for some bad things. One might argue that it is the way my pain feels — its badness — and not any connection between me and the pain that gives me reason to alleviate it.
If so, I have reason to alleviate the pain of others Nagel , Rachels This argument can be directed against rational egoism as well. A second argument against ethical egoism was made by H. He argues that self-interest is the wrong sort of reason. I do not, for example, think the reason I have a duty to help a drowning child is that helping benefits me Prichard 1, 9, 26, 29, 30, , , , But ethical egoism can be seen as making categorical ought-claims.
And the historical popularity of ethical egoism, which Prichard so often notes, indicates that self-interest is not obviously irrelevant to what one ought to do in a not specifically moral sense. One might also object to Prichard-style arguments that a they are question-begging, since egoists will hardly agree that my reason for helping is something other than the benefit to me, and b given disagreement over this claim about my reason, the appropriate response is to suspend judgment about it.
The difference is that rational egoists aim at knowledge, and for putative knowledge, in cases of disagreement between epistemic peers, suspension of belief is required. Moralists aim primarily not at knowledge but at the ability to draw, on their own, true moral conclusions from the evidence. Since aiming at this ability requires not giving weight to the conclusions of others, suspension of belief in cases of disagreement is not required of them.
Obviously, much here depends on the claim about the aim of moralists. One might object that moralists care much more about getting true moral conclusions than about arriving at them on their own.
If I could guarantee that I do the right act by relying on a Moral Answers Machine and not otherwise , I ought to do so. Say ethical egoism recommends that A and B both go to a certain hockey game, since going to the game is in the self-interest of each. Unfortunately, only one seat remains. Ethical egoism, then, recommends an impossible state of affairs. Or say that I am A and an ethical egoist.
Against the first inconsistency charge, the ethical egoist can reply that ethical egoism provides no neutral ranking of states of affairs. It recommends to A that A go to the game, and to B that B go to the game, but is silent on the value of A and B both attending the game. Against the second inconsistency charge, the ethical egoist can claim that she morally recommends that B go to the game, although she desires that B not go.
This is no more odd than claiming that my opponent in a game would be wise to adopt a particular strategy, while desiring that he not do so. True, the ethical egoist is unlikely to recommend ethical egoism to others, to blame others for violations of what ethical egoism requires, to justify herself to others on the basis of ethical egoism, or to express moral attitudes such as forgiveness and resentment.
These publicity worries may disqualify ethical egoism as a moral theory, but do not show inconsistency. A fourth argument against ethical egoism is just that: ethical egoism does not count as a moral theory. Many of these constraints are met by ethical egoism — the formal constraints, for example, that moral claims must be prescriptive and universalizable.
For sample discussions of these two objections, see Baier —; Campbell ; Frankena 18—20; Kalin The issue of what makes for a moral theory is contentious.
An ethical egoist could challenge whatever constraint is deployed against her. But a neater reply is to move to rational egoism, which makes claims about what one has reason to do, ignoring the topic of what is morally right. This gets at what ethical egoists intend, while skirting the issue of constraints on moral theories. After all, few if any ethical egoists think of egoism as giving the correct content of morality, while also thinking that what they have most reason to do is determined by some non-egoist consideration.
One could then, if one wished, argue for ethical egoism from rational egoism and the plausible claim that the best moral theory must tell me what I have most reason to do. As with ethical egoism, there are variants which drop maximization or evaluate rules or character traits rather than actions. There are also variants which make the maximization of self-interest necessary but not sufficient, or sufficient but not necessary, for an action to be the action I ought to perform.
Again, I set these issues aside. Like ethical egoism, rational egoism needs arguments to support it. In the second version, everybody ought to act in their own best interest, and they ought to be concerned about others only to the extent that this also contributes to their own interests. Should's and shouldn'ts Every ethical theory recommends certain actions, and prohibits others. In this case, ethical egoism recommends looking out for one's own long-term self-interest.
It also says that we are morally obligated to avoid being concerned for others if by doing so it does not further out own interests. Take any ethical situation you can think of -- any moral dilemma. View it from the perspective of the ethical egoist -- how different does it look than from the perspective of ordinary ethical principles?
Think of the standard ethical principles -- truth-telling, generosity, non-maleficence this means: do no harm , do not insult, fulfill your promises, etc. From earlier documents, we know that ethical theories ground, or explain, or provide a theoretical explanation for principles. One very important question we will continue to ask throughout this semester is: do the theories we are looking at do a good job of accounting for these principles?
Take "truth telling" as an example. The principle suggests that we should tell the truth, that we ought not deceive others. Ethical egoism explains why this principle holds -- it explains the ground of our obligation.
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